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Abstract
We de￿ne and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-
Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is
similar in all strategic situations. For a ￿xed game and action de￿ne the distance be-
tween a pair of types as the di⁄erence between the smallest " for which the action is "
interim correlated rationalizable. We de￿ne a strategic topology in which a sequence of
types converges if and only if this distance tends to zero for any action and game. Thus
a sequence of types converges in the strategic topology if that smallest " does not jump
either up or down in the limit. As applied to sequences, the upper-semicontinuity prop-
erty is equivalent to convergence in the product topology, but the lower-semicontinuity
property is a strictly stronger requirement, as shown by the electronic mail game. In
the strategic topology, the set of "￿nite types" (types describable by ￿nite type spaces)
is dense but the set of ￿nite common-prior types is not.
JEL classi￿cation and keywords: C70, C72, rationalizability, incomplete informa-
tion, common knowledge, universal type space, strategic topology.
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11 Introduction
The universal type space proposed by Harsanyi (1967/68) and constructed by Mertens
and Zamir (1985) shows how (under some technical assumptions) any incomplete information
about a strategic situation can be embedded in a single "universal" type space. As a practical
matter, applied researchers do not work with that type space but with smaller subsets of
the universal type space. Mertens and Zamir showed that ￿nite types are dense under the
product topology, but under this topology the rationalizable actions of a given type may
be very di⁄erent from the rationalizable actions of a sequence of types that approximate
it.1 This leads to the question of whether and how one can use smaller type spaces to
approximate the predictions that would be obtained from the universal type space.
To address this question, we de￿ne and analyze "strategic topologies" on types, under
which two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations.
There are three ingredients that need to be formalized in this approach: how we vary the
"strategic situations," what is meant by "strategic behavior" (i.e., what solution concept),
and what is meant by "similar."
To de￿ne "strategic situations," we start with a given space of uncertainty, ￿, and a type
space over that space, i.e. all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about ￿. We then study
the e⁄ect of changing the action sets and payo⁄functions while holding the type space ￿xed.
We are thus implicitly assuming that any "payo⁄relevant state" can be associated with any
payo⁄s and actions. This is analogous to Savage￿ s assumption that all acts are possible,
and thus implicitly that any "outcome" is consistent with any payo⁄-relevant state. This
separation between the type space and the strategic situation is standard in the mechanism-
design literature, and it seems necessary for any sort of comparative statics analysis, but
it is at odds with the interpretation of the universal type space as describing all possible
uncertainty, including uncertainty about the payo⁄functions and actions. According to this
latter view one cannot identify "higher order beliefs" independent of payo⁄s in the game.2
In contrast, our de￿nition of a strategic topology relies crucially on making this distinction.
Our notion of "strategic behavior" is the set of interim-correlated-rationalizable actions
1This is closely related to the di⁄erence between common knowledge and mutual knowledge of order n
that is emphasized by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and Rubinstein (1989).
2See the discussion in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994, Remark 4.20b).
2that we analyzed in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2005). This set of actions is obtained by
the iterative deletion of all actions that are not best responses given a type￿ s beliefs over
others￿types and Nature and any (perhaps correlated) conjectures about which actions are
played at a given type pro￿le and payo⁄-relevant state. Under interim correlated rationaliz-
ability, a player￿ s conjectures allow for arbitrary correlation between other players￿actions,
and between other players￿actions and the payo⁄ state; in the complete information case,
this de￿nition reduces to the standard de￿nition of correlated rationalizability (e.g., as in
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)). A key advantage of this solution concept for our purposes
is that all type spaces that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-
correlated-rationalizable outcomes, so it is a solution concept which can be characterized by
working with the universal type space.
It remains to explain our notion of "similar" behavior. Our goal is to ￿nd a topology
on types that is ￿ne enough that the set of interim-correlated-rationalizable actions has
the continuity properties that the best-response correspondences, rationalizable actions, and
Nash equilibria all have in complete-information games, while still being coarse enough to
be useful.3 A review of those properties helps clarify our work. Fix a family of complete-
information games with payo⁄ functions that depend continuously on a parameter ￿, where
￿ lies in a metric space ￿. Because best responses include the case of exact indi⁄erence, the
set of best responses for player i to a ￿xed opponents￿strategy pro￿le aj, denoted BRi(aj;￿),
is upper hemicontinuous but not lower hemicontinuous in ￿, i.e. it may be that ￿
n ! ￿; and
ai 2 BRi(aj;￿); but there is no sequence an
i 2 BRi(aj;￿
n) that converges to ai. However, the
set of "-best responses,4 BRi(aj;";￿); is well behaved: if ￿
n ! ￿; and ai 2 BRi(aj;";￿); then
for any an
i ! ai there is a sequence "n ! 0 such that an
i 2 BRi(aj;"+"n;￿
n). In particular,
the smallest " for which ai 2 BRi(aj;";￿) is a continuous function of ￿. Moreover the same
is true for the set of all "-Nash equilibria (Fudenberg and Levine (1986)) and for the set of
"-rationalizable actions. That is, the " that measures the departure from best response or
equilibrium is continuous. The strategic topology is the coarsest metric topology with this
3Topology P is ￿ner than topology P0 if every open set in P0 is an open set in P. The use of a very
￿ne topology such as the discrete topology makes continuity trivial, but it also makes it impossible to
approximate one type with another; hence our search for a relatively coarse topology. We will see that our
topology is the coarsest metrizable topology with the desired continuity property; this leaves open whether
other, non-metrizable, topologies have this property.
4An action is an "-best response if it gives a payo⁄ within " of the best response.
3continuity property.
Thus for a ￿xed game and action, we identify for each type of a player, the smallest " for
which the action is " interim correlated rationalizable. The distance between a pair of types
(for a ￿xed game and action) is the di⁄erence between those smallest "0s. In our strategic
topology a sequence converges if and only if this distance tends to zero pointwise for any
action and game. Thus a sequence of types converges in the strategic topology if, for any
game and action, the smallest " does not jump either up or down in the limit, so that the
map from types to " is both upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous. We show that
a sequence has the upper semi-continuity property if and only if it converges in the product
topology (theorem 2), that a sequence has the lower semi-continuity property if and only if
it converges in the strategic topology, and that if a sequence has the lower semi-continuity
property then it converges in the product topology (theorem 1). A version of the electronic
mail game shows that the converse is false: the lower semi-continuity property and thus
convergence in the strategic topology are strictly stronger requirements than convergence in
the product topology. An illustration of the extra strength of the strategic topology is the
fact that ￿nite common prior types are dense in the product topology (Lipman (2003)) but
are not dense in the strategic topology (as we show in section 7.3).
Our main result is that ￿nite types are dense in the strategic topology (theorem 3). Thus
￿nite type spaces do approximate the universal type space, so that the strategic behavior￿
de￿ned as the "-correlated-interim-rationalizable actions￿ of any type can be approximated
by a ￿nite type. However, this does not imply that the set of ￿nite types is large. In fact,
while ￿nite types are dense in the strategic topology (and the product topology), they are
small in the sense of being category I in the product topology and the strategic topology.
Our paper follows Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1997) in seeking
to characterize "strategic topologies" in incomplete-information games. These earlier pa-
pers de￿ned topologies on priors or partitions in common-prior information systems with a
countable number of types, and used equilibrium as the solution concept.5 We do not have
a characterization of our strategic topology in terms of beliefs, so we are unable to pin down
the relation to these earlier papers.
5For Monderer and Samet (1986), an information system was a collection of partitions on a ￿xed state
space with a given prior. For Kajii and Morris (1997), an information system was a prior on a ￿xed type
space.
4We have used interim correlated rationalizability as the benchmark for rational play.
There are two reasons for this choice. First, interim correlated rationalizability depends only
on hierarchies of beliefs, and hence is suitable for analysis using the universal type space.
In contrast, two types with the same hierarchy of beliefs may have di⁄erent sets of Nash
equilibrium strategies and interim-independent-rationalizable strategies: this is because they
can correlate their play on payo⁄-irrelevant signals using what Mertens and Zamir (1985)
call redundant types. If one de￿ned a strategic topology with a solution concept that is not
determined by hierarchies of beliefs, one would have to decide what to do about the sensitivity
of other solution concepts to "redundant types," i.e., types with the same hierarchy of beliefs
but di⁄erent correlation possibilities. Second, due to our focus on the universal type space,
we have chosen not to impose a common prior on the beliefs. In Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris
(2005), we argue that interim correlated rationalizability characterizes the implications of
common knowledge of rationality without the common prior assumption. Dekel, Fudenberg,
and Levine (2004) have argued that the notion of equilibrium without a common prior has
neither an epistemic nor a learning-theoretic foundation. In short, we think this is the natural
solution concept for this problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the electronic mail game and the
failure of the lower-semicontinuity property (but not the upper-semicontinuity property)
of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes with respect to the product topology. The
universal type space is described in section 3 and the incomplete information games and
interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes we will analyze are introduced in section 4. The
strategic topology is de￿ned in section 5 and our main results about the strategic topology
are reported in section 6. The concluding section, 7, contains some discussion of the inter-
pretation of our results, including the "genericity" of ￿nite types, the role of the common
prior assumption and an alternative stronger uniform strategic topology on types. All proofs
not contained in the body of the paper are provided in the appendix.
2 Electronic Mail Game
To introduce the basic issues we use a variant of Rubinstein￿ s (1989) electronic mail game
that illustrates the failure of a lower-semicontinuity property in the product topology (de￿ned
formally below). Speci￿cally, we will use it to provide a sequence of types, tik, that converge
5to a type ti1 in the product topology, while there is an action that is 0-rationalizable for ti1
but is not "-rationalizable for tik for any " < 1
2 and ￿nite k. Thus the minimal " for which
the action is "-rationalizable jumps down in the limit, and the lower-semicontinuity property
discussed in the introduction is not satis￿ed. Intuitively, for interim-correlated-rationalizable
play, the tails of higher order beliefs matter, but the product topology is insensitive to the
tails.
On the other hand the set of rationalizable actions does satisfy an upper-semicontinuity
property with respect to the sequence of types t1k converging in the product topology to t11:
since every action is 0-rationalizable for type t11, the minimum " cannot jump up in the limit.
In section 6 we show that product convergence is equivalent to this upper-hemicontinuity
property in general.
Example: Each player has two possible actions A1 = A2 = fN;Ig ("not invest" or "invest").
There are two payo⁄ states, ￿ = f0;1g. In payo⁄ state 0, payo⁄s are given by the following
matrix:
￿ = 0 N I
N 0;0 0;￿2
I ￿2;0 ￿2;￿2
In payo⁄ state 1, payo⁄s are given by:
￿ = 1 N I
N 0;0 0;￿2
I ￿2;0 1;1
Player i￿ s types are Ti = fti1;ti2;::::g[fti1g. Beliefs are generated by the following common
prior on the type space:
￿ = 0 t21 t22 t23 t24 ￿￿￿ t21
t11 (1 ￿ ￿)￿ 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0
t12 0 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0
t13 0 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0





. . . ... . . .
t11 0 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0
6￿ = 1 t21 t22 t23 t24 ￿￿￿ t21
t11 0 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0
t12 (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿) (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)
2 0 0 ￿￿￿ 0
t13 0 (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)
3 (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)
4 0 ￿￿￿ 0
t14 0 0 (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)






. . . ... . . .
t11 0 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ ￿
where ￿, ￿ 2 (0;1). There is a sense in which the sequence (t1k)
1
k=1 converges to t11. Observe
that type t12 of player 1 knows that ￿ = 1 (but does not know if player 2 knows it). Type
t13 of player 1 knows that ￿ = 1, knows that player 2 knows it (and knows that 1 knows it),
but does not know if 2 knows that 1 knows that 2 knows it. For k ￿ 3, each type t1k knows
that ￿ = 1, knows that player 2 knows that 1 knows... (k ￿ 2 times) that ￿ = 1. But for
type t11, there is common knowledge that ￿ = 1. Thus type t1k agrees with type t11 up to
2k ￿ 3 levels of beliefs. We will later de￿ne more generally the idea of product convergence
of types, i.e., the requirement that kth level beliefs converge for every k. In this example,
(t1k)
1
k=1 converges to t11 in the product topology.
We are interested in the "-interim-correlated-rationalizable actions in this game. We will
provide a formal de￿nition shortly, but the idea is that we will iteratively delete an action
for a type at round k if that action is not an "-best response for any conjecture over the
action-type pairs of the opponent that survived to round k ￿ 1.
Clearly, both N and I are 0 interim correlated rationalizable for types t11 and t21 of
players 1 and 2, respectively. But action N is the unique "-interim-correlated-rationalizable
action for all types of each player i except ti1, for every " < 1+￿
2￿￿ (note that 1+￿
2￿￿ > 1
2). To
see this ￿x any " < 1+￿
2￿￿. Clearly, I is not "-rationalizable for type t11, since the expected
payo⁄ from action N is 0 independent of player 2￿ s action, whereas the payo⁄ from action I
is ￿2. Now suppose we can establish that I is not "-rationalizable for types t11 through t1k.













Thus I is not "-rationalizable for type t2k. A symmetric argument establishes if I is not
"-rationalizable for types t21 through t2k, then I is not "-rationalizable for type t1;k+1. Thus
the conclusion holds by induction. ￿
7We conclude that strategic outcomes are not continuous in the product topology. Thus
the denseness of ￿nite types in the product topology does not imply that they will be dense
in our strategic topology.
3 Types
Games of incomplete information are modelled using type spaces. In this paper we work
primarily with the "universal type space" developed by Mertens and Zamir (1985).6 This
type space is called "universal" because it can be used to embed the belief hierarchies (de-
￿ned below) that are derived from arbitrary type spaces. In this paper, we will occasionally
construct ￿nite and countable type spaces, but we will not need to work with general un-
countable type spaces, so we will not develop the machinery and assumptions needed to
handle them. We review the relevant concepts here.
The set of agents is I = f1;2g; we also denote them by i and j = 3 ￿ i.7 Let ￿ be a
￿nite set representing possible payo⁄-relevant moves by Nature.8 Throughout the paper, we
write ￿(￿) for the set of probability measures on the Borel ￿eld of any topological space ￿;
when ￿ is ￿nite or countable we use the Borel ￿eld corresponding to the discrete topology,
so that all subsets of ￿ are measurable.
De￿nition 1 A countable (￿nite) type space is any collection (Ti;￿i)i2I where Ti is a count-
able (￿nite) set and ￿i : Ti ! ￿(Tj ￿ ￿).
6See also Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Heifetz (1993), and Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994). Since
￿ is ￿nite, the construction here yields the same universal space with the same ￿-￿elds as the topology-free
construction of Heifetz and Samet (1998); see Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2005).
7We restrict the analysis to the two player case for notational convenience. We do not think that there
would be any di¢ culties extending the results to any ￿nite number of players.
8We choose to focus on ￿nite ￿ as here the choice of a topology is obvious, while in larger spaces the
topology on types will depend on the underlying topology on ￿.
8Let
X0 = ￿
X1 = X0 ￿ ￿(X0)
. . .
Xk = Xk￿1 ￿ ￿(Xk￿1)
. . .
where ￿(Xk) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence of measures (i.e., the "weak"
topology) and each Xk is given the product topology over its two components. Note that
because ￿ is ￿nite, each Xk and ￿(Xk) is compact. An element (￿1;￿2;:::) 2 ￿1
k=0￿(Xk) is
a hierarchy of beliefs.
Next we show how to calculate the hierarchy of beliefs associated with a given countable
type space.
De￿nition 2 Given a countable type space (Ti;￿i)i2I, for each k = 1;2;:::, de￿ne the kth
level beliefs for each type as follows. The ￿rst-level beliefs are b ￿i;1 : Ti ! ￿(X0); where





















Let b ￿i (ti) = (b ￿i;k (ti))
1
k=1.
Mertens and Zamir (1985) show the existence of a subset of hierarchies, T ￿ ￿ ￿1
k=0￿(Xk),
and a function ￿￿ : T ￿ ! ￿(T ￿ ￿ ￿) that preserves beliefs (i.e., margXk￿￿ (t) = ￿k+1 (t)),
that￿ by de￿ning T ￿
i = T ￿ and ￿￿
i = ￿￿￿ generate a universal type space (T ￿
i ;￿￿
i)i2I into
which all "suitably regular" type spaces can be embedded, in the sense that any hierarchy of
beliefs generated by such a type space is an element of T ￿.9 In particular, ￿nite and countable
9The Mertens-Zamir result applies to type spaces that are Polish, and given the Borel sigma ￿eld. Heifetz
and Samet (1998) extend the result to a class of non-topological type spaces.
9type spaces are covered by the Mertens and Zamir result, and the function b ￿i constructed
above maps any type from a countable type space into T ￿. The same mapping sends the
set of types in any countable type space into a subset of T ￿
i ; this subset is a ￿belief-closed
subspace￿of the universal type space.
De￿nition 3 A countable belief-closed subspace is a collection (Ti;￿￿
i)i2I where Ti ￿ T ￿
i is
countable and ￿￿
i (ti)[Tj ￿ ￿] = 1 for all i 2 I and all ti 2 Ti: It is ￿nite if Ti is ￿nite for
i = 1;2.
While we construct and use countable type spaces, we are only interested in the hierar-
chies of beliefs generated by those type spaces, and hence the belief-closed subspaces into
which they are mapped. Therefore, whenever type spaces (Ti;￿i)i2I are constructed, we
will abuse notation and view the types ti 2 Ti as elements of the universal type space with
￿￿
i (ti) being the belief over j￿ s types and Nature, rather than write the more cumbersome
￿￿
i (^ ￿i (ti)).
Since our main result is that ￿nite types are dense in the universal type space, we need
to de￿ne ￿nite types.
De￿nition 4 A type ti 2 T ￿
i is ￿nite if it is an element of a ￿nite belief-closed subspace,





j2I is a ￿nite belief-closed subspace. A
type is in￿nite if it is not ￿nite.
Remark 1 If a type space (Ti;￿i)i2I is ￿nite then each ti 2 Ti corresponds to a ￿nite type
in the universal type space. However, an in￿nite type space can contain some ￿nite types,
for two reasons. First, an in￿nite number of types can be mapped to the same type in the
universal type space; for example, a complete-information game where ￿ is a singleton and so
each player necessarily has a single belief hierarchy can be combined with a publicly-observed
randomizing device to create an in￿nite type space. Second, a ￿nite belief-closed subspace
can always be combined with a disjoint in￿nite type space to yield an in￿nite type space that
contains ￿nite types; the types ft11;t21g in the email game are an example of this.
Remark 2 To test whether a given type in a type space is ￿nite, it must be mapped into
its hierarchy of beliefs, i.e., into its image in the universal type space. A given type t in the
universal type space is ￿nite if and only if it "reaches" only a ￿nite set of types. We write
10r(t) =support(margT￿￿￿ (t)) for the set of types of the opponent directly reached by type t.
If t0 2 r(t), we say that t0 is reached in one step from t. If type t00 2 r(t0) and t0 2 r(t),
we say that t00 is reached in two steps from t. And so on. Now if we set Z (￿1;t) = ?,
Z (0;t) = ftg and, for k ￿ 1,





then, for k odd, Z (k;t) is the set of types of the opponent reached in k or less steps from t;
and, for k even, Z (k;t) is the set of types of the same player as t reached in k or less steps.
Now type t is ￿nite if and only if Z (k;t) is bounded above.10
Recall that our intent is to ￿nd a strategic topology for the universal type space. However,
types in the universal type space are just hierarchies of beliefs, so we will be considering
topologies on hierarchies of beliefs. For this approach to be sensible, it is important that we
base our topology on a solution concept that depends only on the hierarchy of beliefs and
not on other aspects of the type space. As noted, in our companion paper we show that
interim correlated rationalizability has this property.
4 Games and Interim Correlated Rationalizability
A game G consists of, for each player i, a ￿nite set of possible actions Ai and a payo⁄
function gi, where gi : A ￿ ￿ ! [￿M;M] and M is an exogenous bound on the scale of the
payo⁄s. Note the assumption of a uniform bound on payo⁄s: If payo⁄s can be arbitrarily
large, then best responses, rationalizable sets, etc. are unboundedly sensitive to beliefs, and
as we will see our "strategic topology" reduces to the discrete one; we elaborate on this
point in subsection 7.6. The topology we de￿ne will be independent of the value of the
payo⁄ bound M so long as M is ￿nite.
Here we restate de￿nitions and results from our companion paper, Dekel, Fudenberg and
Morris (2005). In that paper, we varied the type space and held ￿xed the game G being
played and characterized 0-rationalizable actions. In this paper, we ￿x the type space to be
the universal type space (and ￿nite belief-closed subsets of it), but we vary the game G and
10The choice of topology for de￿ning the support of a set is irrelevant since all we care about here is
whether or not it is ￿nite.
11examine "-rationalizable actions, so we will need to make the dependence of the solution on G
and " explicit. The companion paper de￿nes interim correlated rationalizability on arbitrary
type spaces, and show that two types that have the same hierarchy of beliefs (and so map
to the same point in the universal type space T ￿) have the same set of "-interim-correlated-
rationalizable actions for any ": Thus in this paper we can without loss of generality specialize
the de￿nitions and results to the type space T ￿.
For any subset of actions for all types, we ￿rst de￿ne the best replies when conjectures
are restricted to those actions. Let ￿j : T ￿
j ￿ ￿ ! ￿(Aj) denote player i￿ s conjecture
about the distribution of the player j￿ s action as a function of j￿ s type and the state of
Nature. For any measurable ￿j and any belief over opponents￿types and the state of Na-
ture, ￿￿





, let ￿ (￿￿
i (ti);￿j) 2 ￿
￿
T ￿
j ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj
￿
denote the induced joint
conjecture over the space of types, Nature and actions, where for measurable F ￿ T ￿
j ;
￿ (￿￿
i (ti);￿j)(F ￿ f(￿;aj)g) =
R
F ￿j (tj;￿)[aj] ￿ ￿￿
i (ti)[dtj;￿].
De￿nition 5 Given a speci￿cation of a subset of actions for each possible type of opponent,







, with Etj ￿ Aj for all tj and j 6= i, we de￿ne the "-best replies
for ti in game G as
BRi (ti;Ej;G;") =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
ai 2 Ai
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿









(tj;￿;aj) : aj 2 Etj
￿￿
= 1






(gi (ai;aj;￿) ￿ gi (a0
i;aj;￿))d￿
￿ ￿" for all a0
i 2 Ai
9
> > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > ;
:
The correspondence of " best replies in game G for all types given a subset of actions for all



























Remark 3 In cases where Ej is not measurable, we interpret ￿ [f(tj;￿;aj) : aj 2 Ejg] = 1 as
saying that there is a measurable subset E0 ￿ Ej such that v [￿ ￿ E0] = 1. Because A￿i ￿￿
is ￿nite, and utility depends only on actions and conjectures, the set of " best responses in G
11We abuse notation and write BR both for the correspondence specifying best replies for a type and for
the correspondence specifying these actions for all types.
12given some E￿i, BRi (ti;E￿i;G;"), is non-empty provided there exists at least one measurable
￿￿i that satis￿es (1). Such ￿￿i exist whenever E￿i is non-empty and measurable, and more
generally whenever E￿i admits a measurable selection.
The solution concept and closely related notions with which we work in this paper are
given below.
De￿nition 6 For a given game G = (Ai;gi)i2I and ", we use the following notation:













is the largest (in the sense of set inclusion) ￿xed point of BR.
2. The kth-order interim-correlated-rationalizable sets, k = 0;1;2;:::1; are de￿ned as
follows:

























Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2005) establish that the sets are well-de￿ned, and show the
following relationships among them for the case " = 0; the extensions to general non-negative
" are immediate.
Result 1 1. R(G;") equals R1 (G;").
2. Ri;k (G;") and Ri;1 (G;") are measurable functions from Ti ! 2Ai=;, and for each
action ai and each k the sets fti : ai 2 Ri;k (ti;G;")g and fti : ai 2 Ri;1 (ti;G;")g are
closed.
To lighten the paper, we will frequently drop the "interim correlated" modi￿er, and
simply speak of rationalizable sets and rationalizability whenever no confusion will result.
In de￿ning our strategic topology, we will exploit the following closure properties of R as
a function of ".
Lemma 1 For each k = 0;1;:::, if "n # " and ai 2 Ri;k (ti;G;"n) for all n, then ai 2
Ri;k (ti;G;").
13Proof. We will prove this by induction. It is vacuously true for k = 0:
Suppose that it holds true up to k ￿ 1. Let
￿i;k (ti;￿) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
  2 ￿(Aj ￿ ￿) :




for some ￿ 2 ￿
￿
T ￿
j ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj
￿
such that
￿ [f(tj;￿;aj) : aj 2 Rj;k￿1 (tj;G;￿)g] = 1
and margT￿￿￿￿ = ￿￿
i (ti)
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
.
The sequence ￿i;k (ti;"n) is decreasing in n (under set inclusion) and converges (by ￿-
additivity) to ￿i;k (ti;"); moreover, in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2005) we show that





  2 ￿(Aj ￿ ￿) :
X
aj;￿
  (aj;￿)(gi (ai;aj;￿) ￿ gi (a
0







The sequence ￿i;k (ti;ai;"n) is decreasing in n (under set inclusion) and converges to ￿i;k (ti;ai;").
Now ai 2 Ri;k (ti;G;"n) for all n
) ￿i;k (ti;"
n) \ ￿i;k (ti;ai;"
n) 6= ? for all n
) ￿i;k (ti;") \ ￿i;k (ti;ai;") 6= ?
) ai 2 Ri;k (ti;G;"),
where the second implication follows from the ￿nite intersection property of compact sets.
Proposition 1 If "n # " and ai 2 Ri (ti;G;"n) for all n, then ai 2 Ri (ti;G;"). Thus for
any ti, ai and G
minf" : ai 2 Ri (ti;G;")g
exists.
Proof.
ai 2 Ri (ti;G;"
n) for all n
) ai 2 Ri;k (ti;G;"
n) for all n and k
) ai 2 Ri;k (ti;G;") for all k, by the above lemma
) ai 2 Ri (ti;G;").
Since we are considering a ￿xed ￿nite game, inf f" : ai 2 Ri (ti;G;")g is ￿nite, and the
￿rst part of the proposition shows that the in￿mum is attained.
145 The Strategic Topology
5.1 Basic De￿nitions
The most commonly used topology on the universal type space is the "product topology"
on the hierarchy.
De￿nition 7 tn
i !￿ ti if, for each k, ￿k (tn
i ) ! ￿k (ti) as n ! 1.
Here, the convergence of beliefs at a ￿xed level in the hierarchy, represented by !, is with
respect to the topology of weak convergence of measures.12
However, we would like to use a topology that is ￿ne enough that the "-best-response cor-
respondence and "-rationalizable sets have the continuity properties satis￿ed by the "-best-
response correspondence, "-Nash equilibrium and "-rationalizability in complete information
games with respect to the payo⁄functions. The electronic mail game shows that the product
topology is too coarse for these continuity properties to obtain, which suggests the use of a
￿ner topology. One way of phrasing our question is whether there is any topology that is
￿ne enough for the desired continuity properties and yet coarse enough that ￿nite types are
dense; our main result is that indeed there is: this is true for the "strategic topology" that
we are about to de￿ne.
Ideally, it would be nice to know that our strategic topology is the coarsest one with
the desired continuity properties, but since non-metrizable topologies are hard to analyze,
we have chosen to work with a metric topology. Hence we construct the coarsest metric
topology with the desired properties.
For any ￿xed game and feasible action, we de￿ne the distance between a pair of types as
the di⁄erence between the smallest " that would make that action "-rationalizable in that
game. Thus for any G = (Ai;gi)i2I and ai 2 Ai
hi (tijai;G) = minf" : ai 2 Ri (ti;G;")g
di (ti;t
0
ijai;G) = jhi (tijai;G) ￿ hi (t
0
ijai;G)j
In extending this to a distance over types, we allow for a larger di⁄erence in the h￿ s in
games with more actions. Thus, the metric that we de￿ne is not uniform over the number of
12It is used not only in the constructions by Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel
(1993) but also in more recent work by Lipman (2003) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2003).
15actions in the game. When studying a game with a large or unbounded number of actions,
we think there should be a metric on actions and accompanying constraints on the set of
admissible payo⁄ functions (such as continuity or single-peakedness) that make "nearby"
actions "similar." Requiring uniformity here would require that strategic convergence be
uniform over the number of actions in the game, and this seems too strong a requirement
given that we allow arbitrary (bounded) payo⁄ functions.
For any integer m; there is no loss in generality in taking the action spaces to be Am
1 =
Am
2 = f1;2;:;mg. Having ￿xed the action sets, a game is parameterized by the payo⁄
function g. So for a ￿xed m, we will write g for the game G = (f1;2;:;mg;f1;2;:;mg;g);
and Gm for the set of all such games g.













where 0 < ￿ < 1.
Lemma 2 The distance d is a pseudo-metric:
Proof. First note d is symmetric by de￿nition. To see that d satis￿es the triangle inequality,
note that for each action ai and game g;
d(ti;t
00
ijai;g) = jhi (tijai;g) ￿ hi (t
00
ijai;g)j
￿ jhi (tijai;g) ￿ hi (t
0
ijai;g)j + jhi (t
0





















































































16Theorem 1 below implies that d(ti;t0
i) = 0 ) ti = t0
i, so that d is in fact a metric.
De￿nition 8 The strategic topology is the topology generated by d.
To analyze and explain the strategic topology, we characterize its convergent sequences
using the following two conditions.13




n=1 ;ti) satisfy the upper strategic convergence property (written tn
i !U ti) if for
every m, ai 2 Am
i ; and g 2 Gm, hi (tn




n=1 ;ti) satisfy the lower strategic convergence property (written tn
i !L ti) if for
every m, ai 2 Am
i , and g 2 Gm hi (tn
i jai;g) is lower semicontinuous in n.
Recall that by the de￿nition of upper semicontinuity if tn
i !U ti then for each m and
g 2 Gm, there exists "n ! 0 such that hi (tijai;g) < hi (tn
i jai;g) + "n for all n and ai 2 Am
i .
The statement for lower semicontinuity is analogous (switching tn
i and ti in the implication).
Lemma 11 in the appendix states that for each m the sequence "n can be chosen inde-
pendently of g, so that upper and lower strategic convergence have the following stronger
implications: for each m,
t
n
i !U ti ) 9"
n ! 0 s.t. hi (tijai;g) < hi (t
n




i !L ti ) 9"
n ! 0 s.t. hi (t
n
i jai;g) < hi (tijai;g) + "
n
for every n, ai 2 Am
i , and g 2 Gm.14
13In metric spaces convergence and continuity can be assessed by looking at sequences (Munkres (1975),
p.190). Since we show in section 6.1 that each convergence condition coincides with convergence according
to a metric topology (the product and strategic topologies respectively) we conclude that the open sets
de￿ned directly from the convergence notions below do de￿ne these topologies. We do not know if there are
non-metrizable topologies with the same convergent sequences.
14If we de￿ned convergence of tn
i by upper (and lower) hemicontinuity of the correspondence Ri (G;") :
Ti ! 2Ai￿
?, then whether a sequence tn
i converged to ti would depend on whether hi (tn
i jai;g) ￿ " implied
hi (tijai;g) ￿ " (and conversely). We did not adopt this approach because by analogy with ￿nite-dimensional
cases we do not expect R to be everywhere lower hemicontinuous. Note though that tn
i !U ti does imply
that if for "n ! 0, ai 2 Ri (tn
i ;g;"n) for each n, then ai 2 Ri (ti;g;0). Also, tn
i !L ti implies that if
ai 2 Ri (ti;g;0), then there exists "n ! 0 such that ai 2 Ri (tn
i ;g;"n) for each n.
17We do not require convergence uniformly over all games, as an upper bound on the
number of actions m is ￿xed before the approximating sequence "n is chosen. Requiring
uniformity over all games would considerably strengthen the topology, as brie￿ y discussed
in section 7.5.
Lemma 3 d(tn
i ;ti) ! 0 if and only if tn
i !U ti and tn
i !L ti.
Proof. Suppose d(tn






Now for any ai 2 Am























i jai;g) ￿ hi (tijai;g)j ￿ ￿
￿md(t
n
i ;ti) = "
n;
thus tn
i !U ti and tn
i !L ti.
Conversely, suppose that tn
i !U ti and tn
i !L ti. Then 8m, 9 "n (m) ! 0 and "n (m) !
0 such that for all ai;G 2 Gm,
hi (tijai;g) < hi (t
n

























! 0 as n ! 1.
The strategic topology is thus a metric topology where sequences converge if and only if
they satisfy upper and lower strategic convergence,and so the strategic topology is the coars-
est metric topology with the desired continuity properties. We now illustrate the strategic
topology with the example discussed earlier.
185.2 The E-Mail Example Revisited
We can illustrate the de￿nitions in this section with the e-mail example introduced
informally earlier. We show that we have convergence of types in the product topol-
ogy, t1k !￿ t11, corresponding to the upper semicontinuity noted in section 2, while
d(t1k;t11) 6! 0, corresponding to the failure of lower semicontinuity.














2￿￿, if (t2;￿) = (t2;m￿1;1)
1￿￿
2￿￿, if (t2;￿) = (t2m;1)
0, otherwise














2￿￿, if (t1;￿) = (t11;0)
1￿￿









2￿￿, if (t1;￿) = (t1m;1)
1￿￿
2￿￿, if (t1;￿) = (t1;m+1;1)
0, otherwise





1, if (t1;￿) = (t11;1)
0, otherwise
One can verify that t1k !￿ t11. This is actually easiest to see by looking at the table
presenting the beliefs: t1m assigns probability 1 to ￿ = 1, to 2 assigning probability 1 to
￿ = 1, to 2 assigning probability 1 to 1 assigning probability 1 to ￿ = 1; and so on up to
iterations of length m ￿ 1. As m ! 1; the kth level beliefs converge to those of t11 where
it is common knowledge that ￿ = 1.
Note that the only ￿nite types here are ti1.


















fNg, if t1 = t11












fNg, if t1 = t11







fNg, if t2 = t21







fNg, if t1 2 ft11;t12g







fNg, if t2 = t21







fNg, if t1 2 ft11;:::;t1mg







fNg, if t2 2 ft21;:::;t2mg
fN;Ig, if t2 2 ft2;m+1;t2;m+2;:::g [ ft21g







fNg, if t1 2 ft11;:::;t1;m+1g







fNg, if t2 2 ft21;:::;t2mg
fN;Ig, if t2 2 ft2;m+1;t2;m+2;:::g [ ft21g







fNg, if t1 2 ft11;t12;:::g







fNg, if t2 2 ft21;t22;:::g












2, if k = 1
1+￿
2￿￿, if k = 2;3;:::





￿ ￿N; b G
￿
= 0 for all k.
Thus d(t1k;t11) ￿ ￿
2 1+￿
2￿￿ for all k = 2;3;:: and we do not have d(t1k;t11) ! 0.
6 Results
6.1 The relationships among the notions of convergence
We ￿rst demonstrate that both lower strategic convergence and upper strategic conver-
gence imply product convergence.
Theorem 1 Upper strategic convergence implies product convergence. Lower strategic con-
vergence implies product convergence.












where 0 < ￿ < 1 and e dk is a metric on the kth level beliefs that generates the topology of weak
convergence. One such metric is the Prokhorov metric, which is de￿ned as follows. For any
metric space X; let F be the Borel sets, and for A 2 F set A￿ = fx 2 Xjinfy2A jx￿yj ￿ ￿g:
Then the Prokhorov distance between measures ￿ and ￿
0 is dP(￿;￿
0) = inff￿j￿(A) ￿ ￿
0(A￿)+￿
for all A 2 Fg, and ~ dk(ti;t0
i) = dP(￿k(ti);￿k(t0
i)):
21Lemma 4 For all k and c > 0 , there exist " > 0 and m such that if e dk(ti;t0
i) > c, there
exist G 2 Gm and ai such that hi (t0
ijai;G) + " < hi (tijai;G).
Proof. To prove this we will construct a variant of a "report your beliefs" game, and show
that any two types whose kth order beliefs di⁄er by ￿ will lose a non-negligible amount by
playing an action that is rationalizable for the other type.
To de￿ne the ￿nite games we will use for the proof, it is useful to ￿rst think of a very large
in￿nite action game where the action space is the type space T ￿. Thus the ￿rst component
of player i￿ s action is a probability distribution over ￿: a1
i 2 ￿(￿). The second component
of the action is an element of ￿(￿￿￿(￿)), and so on. The idea of the proof is to start with
a proper scoring rule for this in￿nite game (so that each player has a unique rationalizable
action, which is to truthfully report his type), and use it to de￿ne a ￿nite game where the
rationalizable actions are ￿close to truth telling.￿
To construct the ￿nite game, we have agents report only the ￿rst k levels of beliefs, and
impose a ￿nite grid on the reports at each level. Speci￿cally, for any ￿xed integer z1 let A1
be the set of probability distributions a1 on ￿ such that for all ￿ 2 ￿; a1(￿) = j=z1 for some
integer j; 1 ￿ j ￿ z1. Thus A1 = fa 2 Rj￿j : a￿ = j=z1 for some integer j; 1 ￿ j ￿ z1;
P
￿ a￿ = 1g; it is a discretization of the set ￿(￿) with grid points that are evenly spaced in
the Euclidean metric.
Let D1 = ￿￿A1. Note that this is a ￿nite set. Next pick an integer z2 and let A2 be the
set of probability distributions on D1 such that a2(d) = j=z2 for some integer j;1 ￿ j ￿ z2.
Continuing in this way we can de￿ne a sequence of ￿nite action sets Aj, where every element
of each Aj is a probability distribution with ￿nite support. The overall action chosen is a
vector in A1 ￿ A2 ￿ ::: ￿ Ak.
We call the am the "mth-order action." Let the payo⁄ function be15












































Note that the objective functions are strictly concave, and that the payo⁄ to the mth-order
action depends only on the state ￿ and on actions of the other player up to the (m ￿ 1)th
15The payo⁄ function given in the text is independent of the payo⁄ bound M, and need not satisfy it if
M is small - in that case we can simply multiply the payo⁄ function by a su¢ ciently small positive number.
22level (so the payo⁄ to a1
i does not depend on player j￿ s action at all). This will allow us









2]. This is the loss to type ti of choosing
a1
i when ￿1(t1) is a feasible ￿rst-order action. For all c > 0, there is b > 0 such that if
e d(￿1(ti);￿1(t0
i)) > c, then l(ti;￿1(t0
i)) > b: In the game with a given ￿nite grid, ￿1(t1) will not
in general be feasible, and the rationalizable ￿rst-order action(s) for type t1 is the point or
points a￿
1(￿1(t1)) 2 A1 that is closest to ￿1(t1); picking any other point involves a greater loss.
Thus the loss to ti from playing an element of a￿
1(￿1(t0
i) instead of an element of a￿
1(￿1(ti)
is at least l(ti;￿1(t0
i)) ￿ "2 ￿ "3; where "2 is the loss from playing a￿
1(￿1(ti) instead of the
(infeasible) ￿1(ti); and "3 is the absolute value of the di⁄erence in i￿ s payo⁄ from playing
a￿
1 (￿1(t0
i)) instead of ￿1(t0
i): Both "2 and "3 go to 0 in z1, uniformly in ti, so for all c > 0, if
e d(￿1(ti);￿1(t0
i)) > c, there are "1 > 0 and z1 such that
hi (tija
￿





This proves the claim for the case k = 1.
Now let ￿2(ti) 2 ￿(￿ ￿ ￿(￿)) be the second-order belief of ti. For any ￿xed ￿rst-level
grid z1, we know from the ￿rst step that there is an "1 > 0 such that for any ￿1; the only "1-
rationalizable ￿rst-order actions are the point or points a￿
1 in the grid that are closest to ￿1:
Suppose that player i believes player j is playing a ￿rst-order action that is "1-rationalizable.
Then player i￿ s beliefs about the ￿nite set D1 = ￿ ￿ A1 correspond to any probability
measure ￿
￿
2 on D1 such that for any X ￿ ￿￿A1, ￿
￿
2 (X) ￿ ￿2 (f(￿;￿1) : f￿g ￿ a￿
1(￿1) ￿ Xg).
That is, for each ￿1 that i thinks j could have, i expects that j will play an element of the
corresponding a￿
1(￿1). Because A2 is a discretization of ￿(D1), player i may not be able to
choose a2 = ￿
￿
2. However, because of the concavity of the objective function, the constrained
second-order best reply of i with beliefs ￿2 is the point a￿
2 2 A2 that is closest to ￿
￿
2 in the
Euclidean metric, and choosing any other action incurs a non-zero loss. Moreover, a￿
2 is at
(Euclidean) distance from ￿
￿
2 that is bounded by the distance between grid points, so there
is a bound on the distance that goes to zero as z2 goes to in￿nity, uniformly over all ￿
￿
2. We
extend the domain of ￿
￿
2 to all of ￿ ￿ ￿(￿) by setting ￿
￿
2(￿ ￿ Y ) = ￿
￿
2(￿ ￿ (A1 \ Y )).
Next we claim that if there is a c > 0 such that e d2(ti;t0






su¢ ciently ￿ne grids A1 on ￿(￿1). To see this, note from the de￿nition of the Prokhorov
23metric, if e d2(ti;t0
i) > c there is a Borel set A in ￿￿￿(￿) such that ￿2(ti)(A) > ￿2(t0
i)(Ac)+c.
Because the ￿rst-order actions a￿
1 converge uniformly to ￿
￿
1 as z1 goes to in￿nity, (￿;a￿
1 (￿1)) 2












i)(Ac), where the ￿rst
inequality follows from set inclusion, the second and fourth from the uniform convergence of
the a￿
1, and the third from e d2(ti;t0
i) > c.
As with the case of ￿rst-order beliefs and actions, this implies that when e d2(ti;t0
i) > c
there is a ￿ z2 and "2 > 0 such that
hi (tija
￿





for all z2 > ￿ z2. We can continue in this way to prove the result for any k.
Lemma 5 Suppose that ti is not the limit of the sequence tn
i in the product topology, then
(tn
i ;ti) satis￿es neither the lower convergence property nor the upper convergence property.
Proof. Failure of product convergence implies that there exists k such that e dk (tn
i ;ti) does




i ;ti) > ￿.
By lemma 4, there exists " and m such that, for all n,
9ai 2 A
m
i ;g 2 G
m s.t. hi (tijai;g) + " < hi (t
n
i jai;g) and (2)
9ai 2 A
m
i ;g 2 G
m s.t. hi (t
n
i jai;g) + " < hi (tijai;g). (3)
Now suppose that the lower convergence property holds. Therefore
9￿
n ! 0 s.t. hi (t
n
i jai;g) < hi (tijai;g) + ￿
n, ai 2 A
m
i ;g 2 G
m.
This combined with (2) gives a contradiction.
Similarly, upper convergence implies the following.
9￿
n ! 0 s.t. hi (tijai;g) < hi (t
n
i jai;g) + ￿
n, ai 2 A
m
i ;g 2 G
m.
This gives a contradiction when combined with (3).
Lemma 5 immediately implies theorem 1.
24Theorem 2 Product convergence implies upper strategic convergence.
Proof. Suppose that tn
i product-converges to ti. If upper strategic convergence fails there is
an m;ai 2 Am
i ;g 2 Gm such that for all "n ! 0 and N, there is n0 > N such that









We may relabel so that tn
i is the subsequence where this inequality holds. Pick ￿ so that
hi (tijai;g) > hi (t
n
i jai;g) + ￿
for all n. Since, for each n and tn
i , ai 2 Ri (tn




j ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj
￿
such that
(1) ￿n [(tj;￿;aj) : aj 2 Rj (tj;g;hi (tijai;g) ￿ ￿)] = 1






[gi (ai;aj;￿) ￿ gi (a0
i;aj;￿)]d￿n ￿ ￿hi (tijai;g) + ￿ for all a0
i 2 Am
i
Since under the product topology, T ￿ is a compact metric space, and since Aj and ￿ are
￿nite, so is T ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj. Thus ￿(T ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj) is compact in the weak topology, so the
sequence ￿n has a limit point, ￿.
Now since (1), (2) and (3) hold for every n and ￿ = limn ￿n, we have
(1*) ￿ [f(tj;￿;aj) : aj 2 Rj (tj;g;hi (tijai;g) ￿ ￿)g] = 1





[gi (ai;aj;￿) ￿ gi (a0
i;aj;￿)]d￿ ￿ ￿hi (tijai;g) + ￿ for all a0
i 2 Am
i .
Here (1*) follows from the fact that f(tj;￿;aj) : aj 2 Rj (tj;g;hi (tijai;g) ￿ ￿)g is closed. To
see why (2*) holds, note that margT￿￿￿￿n ! margT￿￿￿￿, since ￿n ! ￿. It remains to
show that ￿￿
i (tn
i ) ! ￿￿




i )), whenever tn
i !￿ ti. This can be
inferred from the Mertens-Zamir homeomorphism and standard results about the continuity
of marginal distributions in the joint, but a direct proof is about as short: Recall that ￿k (t)is
























i ) = lim margXk￿1￿￿
i (tn
i ) = lim￿k (tn
i ) = ￿k (ti) by product convergence.
This proves (2*); (3*) follows from ￿n ! ￿.
This implies ai 2 Ri (ti;g;hi (tijai;g) ￿ ￿), a contradiction.
25Corollary 1 Lower strategic convergence implies convergence in the strategic topology.
Proof. We have tn
i !L ti ) tn
i !￿ ti (by theorem 1); tn
i !￿ ti ) tn
i !U ti (by theorem 2);
and tn
i !L ti and tn
i !U ti ) d(tn
i ;ti) ! 0 (by lemma 3).
6.2 Finite types are dense in the strategic topology
Theorem 3 Finite types are dense under d.
Given corollary 1, the theorem follows from lemma 6 below, which shows that, for any
type in the universal type space, it is possible to construct a sequence of ￿nite types that
lower converge to it. The proof of lemma 6 is long, and broken into many steps. In outline,
we ￿rst ￿nd a ￿nite grid of games that approximate all games with m actions and show
that "-rationalizable actions in any game are arbitrarily close to "-rationalizable actions in
some game in the ￿nite grid. This allows us to work with such ￿nite grids. We also take
a ￿nite grid of "￿ s, f"jg
m
j=1. We then de￿ne maps fi taking each type of i into a function
that speci￿es for every action of i and every game from the ￿nite grid of games the minimal
"j under which the action is "j rationalizable. Each such function is one of ￿nitely many
types for i. We then de￿ne a belief hierarchy for each type in this ￿nite set of types by
arbitrary taking the belief hierarchy of one of the types in the universal type space to which
it is is mapped. This gives us a ￿nite type space. We show that this map "preserves "":
ai 2 Ri (ti;g;") ) ai 2 Ri (fi (ti);g;"). Finally we show that for any type in the universal
space there is a sequence of these ￿nite types that "lower converge" to it.
Our proof thus follows Monderer and Samet (1996) in constructing a mapping from
types in one type space to types in another type space that preserves approximate best
response properties. Their construction worked for equilibrium, while our construction works
for interim correlated rationalizability, and thus the approximation has to work for many
conjectures over opponents￿play simultaneously. We assume neither a common prior nor a
countable number of types, and we develop a topology on types based on the play of the
given types as opposed to a topology on priors or information systems.16
A distinctive feature of our construction is that we identify types in our constructed type
space with sets of "-rationalizable actions for a ￿nite set of "￿ s and a ￿nite set of games.
16It is not clear how one could develop a topology based on the equilibrium distribution of play in a setting
without a common prior.
26The recent paper of Ely and Peski (2005) similarly identi￿es types with sets of rationalizable
actions, although for their di⁄erent purpose (constructing a universal type space for the
interim-independent-rationalizability solution concept), no approximation is required.










The two critical stages in the proof are as follows. We ￿rst prove that there is a ￿nite set
of m-action games, G
m
, that approximate the set Gm.
Lemma 7 For any integer m and " > 0, there exists a ￿nite collection of m action games
￿ Gm such that, for every g 2 Gm, there exists g0 2 ￿ Gm such that for all i, ti and ai 2 Am
i ,
jhi (tijai;g) ￿ hi (tijai;g
0)j ￿ ".
Next we use this to prove that there is a ￿nite approximating type space.
Lemma 8 Fix the number of actions m and ￿ > 0. There exists a ￿nite type space ￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿
i=1;2
and functions (fi)i=1;2, each fi : T ￿ ! ~ Ti, such that hi (fi (ti)jai;g) ￿ hi (tijai;g)+
￿ for all ti, g 2 Gm and ai.
The key step in this proof is constructing the type space, so we present that here. The
remaining details are provided in the appendix.
Fix a ￿nite set of games ￿ Gm. Write hxi
￿ for the smallest number in the set f0;￿;2￿;g









build the type spaces
￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿
i=1;2
using subsets of ￿m as the types. Speci￿cally, de￿ne the
function fi : T ￿







Let e Ti be the range of fi; note that e Ti is a ￿nite set. Thus for given ￿ each type of
i in the universal type space is mapped into a function that speci￿es for each one of the
￿nitely many games and actions of i the smallest multiple j of ￿ under which that action is
j￿-rationalizable. These functions constitute the types in a ￿nite type space. The beliefs in
this ￿nite type space are de￿ned next.
De￿ne ~ ￿i : e Ti ! ￿
￿
e Tj ￿ ￿
￿
as follows. For each ~ ti 2 e Ti, ￿x any ti 2 T ￿ such that



















(tj;￿) : fj (tj) = ~ tj
￿￿
.
27Now the proof of lemma 6 can be completed as follows. Lemma 8 implies that for any








￿ hi (tijai;g) +
1
m
for all ai 2 Am




2M, if n ￿ m
1
n, if n > m
.







￿ hi (tijai;g) + 2M = hi (tijai;g) + "
n
for all ai 2 Am







￿ hi (tijai;g) +
1
n
= hi (tijai;g) + "
n
for all ai 2 Am
i and g2 Gm if n > m. ￿
7 Discussion
7.1 Outline of issues
The key implication of our denseness result is that there are "enough" ￿nite types to ap-
proximate general ones. In this section we discuss some caveats regarding the interpretation
of this result.
￿ We show that there is a sense in which the set of ￿nite types is small.
￿ We show that ￿nite common-prior types are not dense in the set of ￿nite types and
thus in the set of all types.
￿ We discuss approaches to generalizing our results to alternative solution concepts.
￿ We describe a topology that is uniform over all games: the denseness result does not
hold with such a topology, and hence the same ￿nite type cannot approximate strategic
behavior for an in￿nite type in all games simultaneously.
28￿ We discuss relaxing the uniform bound on payo⁄s that we have used throughout the
paper.
￿ Finally, we emphasize that caution is needed in working with ￿nite types despite our
result.
7.2 Is the set of ￿nite types "generic"?
Our denseness result does not imply that the set of ￿nite types is "generic" in the universal
type space. While it is not obvious why this question is important from a strategic point of
view, we nonetheless brie￿ y report some results showing that the set of ￿nite types is not
generic in either of two standard topological senses.
First, a set is sometimes said to be generic if it is open and dense. But the set of ￿nite
types is not open. To show this, it is enough to show that the set of in￿nite types is dense.
This implies that the set of in￿nite types is not closed and so the set of ￿nite types is not
open.
Let T ￿
n be the collection of all types that exist on ￿nite belief closed subsets of the
universal type space where each player has at most n types. The set of ￿nite types is the
countable union TF = [nT ￿
n. The set of in￿nite types is the complement of TF in T ￿.
Theorem 4 If #￿ ￿ 2, in￿nite types are dense under the product topology and the strategic
topology.
Thus the "open and dense" genericity criterion does not discriminate between ￿nite and
in￿nite types. A more demanding topological genericity criterion is that of "￿rst category".
A set is ￿rst category if it is the countable union of closed sets with empty interiors. In-
tuitively, a ￿rst category set is small or "non-generic". For example, the set of rationals is
dense in the interval [0;1] but not open and not ￿rst category.
Theorem 5 If #￿ ￿ 2, the set of ￿nite types is ￿rst category in T ￿ under the product
topology and under the strategic topology.
Proof. Theorem 4 already established that the closure of the set of in￿nite types is the whole
universal type space. This implies that each T ￿
n has empty interior (in the product topology
and in the strategic topology). Since the set of ￿nite types is the countable union of the T ￿
n,
29it is then enough to establish that each T ￿
n is closed, in the product topology and thus in the
strategic topology.
By Mertens and Zamir (1985), !￿ corresponds to the weak topology on the compact set
T ￿. We will repeatedly use the following implications of weak convergence. If a sequence of
measures ￿k on a metric space X converges weakly to ￿; and the support of every ￿k has n
or fewer elements, then (a) the support of ￿ has at most n elements; (b) every element ￿ x of
the support of ￿ is the limit of a sequence of elements xk 2 support(￿k); moreover, (c) there




that, (i) for all x 2 support(￿), ￿k (x) converges to x and (ii) x;x0 2 support(￿) and x 6= x0
implies ￿k (x) 6= ￿k (x0) for all k > K.
Now recall from remark 2 that, for k even, we write Z (k;t1) for the set of types of player
1 reached in k or less steps from t1 of player 1; and, for k odd, we write Z (k;t1) for the set
of types of player 2 reached in k or less steps from t1. This implies that for even k,










Now ￿x an n, and suppose ￿ tk
1 !￿ ￿ t1 and ￿ tk
1 2 T ￿
n for all k. So ￿ tk
1 2 T k
1 , where T k
1 ￿ T k
2 is
a belief-closed type space with #T k
i ￿ n. We will establish inductively the following claim.




has at most n elements. (2) There exists
KL such that for every k > KL and every t 2 Z (L;t1), there exists ￿k (t) 2 T k
i such that
￿k (t) ! t and ￿k (t) 6= ￿k (t0) for all t;t0 2 Z (L;t1) with t 6= t0 (where i = 1 if L is even and
i = 2 if L is odd).
We ￿rst establish the claim for L = 1. Since ￿￿ ￿
tk￿
is a sequence of measures converging




has at most n elements; (b) there is a sequence ￿k
2 (t2) 2 T k
2
s.t. ￿k
2 (t2) ! t2; and (c) there exists K1 such that for all k > K1, ￿k
2 (t2) 6= ￿k
2 (t0
2) if t2 6= t0
2.
Now suppose that the claim holds for all L ￿ ￿ L ￿ 1, where ￿ L is even. We establish the












































￿ ￿ n since
t
k
1 ! t1, ￿k
2 (t2) ! t2 and supports cannot grow. Thus Z
￿￿ L;t1
￿
has at most n elements.
30Also observe that for each t1 2 Z
￿￿ L;t1
￿
, there is a sequence ￿k
1 (t1) 2 T k
1 s.t. ￿k
1 (t1) ! t1.






2 2 T k
2 . Since Z
￿￿ L;t1
￿




, there is a sequence of ￿k
1 (t1) 2 T k
1 converging to t1 with with ￿k
1 (t1) 6= ￿k
1 (t0
1)
if t1 6= t0
1.
Now suppose that the claim holds for all L ￿ ￿ L ￿ 1, where ￿ L is odd. Essentially the
same argument establishes the claim for ￿ L (apart from labelling, the only di⁄erence from
the case of even ￿ L is that we do not have ￿ t1 in Z (k;￿ t1).
We have now established the claim for all L by induction, and thus that type t1 is an
element of T ￿
n.
Thus the set of ￿nite types is not generic under two standard topological notions of
genericity.
Heifetz and Neeman (2004) use the non-topological notion of "prevalence" to discuss
genericity on the universal type space. Their approach builds in a restriction to common
prior types, and it is not clear how to extend their approach to non common prior types.
They also show that the generic set has the property that any convex combination of an
element in the set with an element of its complement will be in the set. This property is
satis￿ed here as well: convex combinations of ￿nite types with in￿nite types are in￿nite.
7.3 Types with a Common Prior




i=1, and there is a probability distribution ￿￿ on T ￿ (the common prior), that assigns
positive probability to every type of every player, such that ￿￿
i (ti) = ￿￿ (￿jti): The set of
￿nite common-prior types is not dense in the set of ￿nite types, and thus is not dense in the
set of all types. Intuitively, this is because the strategic implications of a common prior (such
as certain no-trade theorems) do not extend to general types. Since Lipman (2003) shows
that the set of ￿nite common prior types is dense in the product topology, this observation
demonstrates a general distinction between the product topology and the strategic topology.
To demonstrate this observation, it is enough to give a single game that separates common
prior types from non common-prior types. Suppose there are two states, L and R. Each
player has two actions, Y (trade) and N (no trade). If a player says N she gets zero, if they
31both say Y they get (1;￿2) and (￿2;1) in states L and R respectively (a negative-sum trade)
and in case one says Y and the other says N the one who said Y gets ￿2 (independent of the
state). Clearly both players saying Y is 0-rationalizable for some non-common prior type:
if a player believes there is common certainty that each player believes the state is the one
favorable to him, they may both say Y . But with common priors the only "-rationalizable
action, for " small enough, is N: Let ~ T be the set of common-prior type pairs for whom Y is








4). However, a similar property, replacing R for L, must also hold for
all t2 2 ~ T2, so there cannot be a common prior on ~ T ￿ fL;Rg with such conditionals.
7.4 Alternative Solution Concepts
We used the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability to de￿ne the strategic
topology. We noted two reasons for doing this: the set of interim correlated rationalizable ac-
tions depend only on hierarchies of beliefs and the solution concept captures the implications
of common knowledge of rationality.
One might wonder what would happen with alternative solution concepts, such as Nash
equilibrium or interim independent rationalizability. But the set of Nash equilibrium ac-
tions or interim-independent-rationalizable actions depend in general not just on the belief
hierarchies but also on "redundant" types: those that di⁄er in their ability to correlate
their behavior with others￿actions and states of the world. In de￿ning a topology for these
solution concepts, one would have to decide what to do about this dependence.
Suppose one wanted to de￿ne a topology on hierarchies of beliefs (despite the fact that
hierarchies of beliefs do not determine these other solution concepts). One approach would
be to examine all actions that could be played by any type with a given hierarchy of beliefs
under that solution concept (allowing for all possible type spaces and not only the universal
type space as we do here). Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2005) show that, given any game
and ￿xed hierarchy of beliefs, the union￿ over all type spaces that contain a type with that
hierarchy of beliefs￿ of the equilibrium actions equals the interim-correlated-rationalizable
actions for that hierarchy of beliefs. The same arguments can be used to prove the same
conclusion for interim-independent-rationalizability.
Another approach would be to ￿x a solution concept and construct a larger representation
32of types, that included hierarchies of beliefs but also incorporated the redundant types that
are relevant for the solution concept. One would then construct a topology on this larger
space. The ￿rst part of this approach￿ constructing the larger type space that incorporated
the redundant types relevant for the solution concept￿ was carried out by Ely and Peski
(2005) for the solution concept of interim-independent-rationalizability for two-person games.
7.5 A Strategic Topology that is Uniform on Games
The upper and lower convergence conditions we took as our starting point are not uniform
over games. As we said earlier, when the number of actions is unbounded, there is usually
a metric on actions and accompanying constraints on the set of admissible payo⁄ functions.
Uniformity over all games without such restrictions seems too demanding and hence of less
interest. Despite this, it seems useful to understand how our results would change if we did
ask for uniformity over games.
Let Ai(G) denote the set of actions for player i in a given game G. A distance on types









This metric yields a topology that is ￿ner than that induced by the metric d, so the topology
is ￿ner than necessary for the upper and lower convergence properties that we took as our
goal. Finite types are not dense with this topology. To show this we use the fact that














where Fk is the collection of bounded functions mapping T ￿ ￿ ￿ that are measurable with
respect to kth level beliefs.
Proposition 2 The metrics d￿ and d￿￿ are equivalent.
An argument of Morris (2002) implies that ￿nite types are not dense in the uniform topology
on beliefs.17 Together with the preceding proposition this implies that ￿nite types are not
dense in the uniform strategic topology generated by d￿.
17For a ￿xed random variable on payo⁄ states, we can identify the higher-order expectations of a type,
337.6 Bounded versus Unbounded Payo⁄s
We have studied topologies on the class of games with uniformly bounded payo⁄s. If
arbitrary payo⁄ functions are allowed, we can always ￿nd a game in which any two types
will play very di⁄erently, so the only topology that makes strategic behavior continuous is the
discrete topology. From this perspective, it is interesting to note that full surplus extraction
results in mechanism design theory (Cremer and McLean (1985), McAfee and Reny (1992))
rely on payo⁄s being unbounded. Thus it is not clear to us how the results in this paper can
be used to contribute to a debate on the genericity of full surplus extraction results.18
7.7 Interpreting the denseness result
That any type can be approximated with a ￿nite type provides only limited support
for the use of simple ￿nite type spaces in applications. The ￿nite types that approximate
arbitrary types in the universal type space are quite complex. The approximation result
shows that ￿nite types could conceivably capture the richness of the universal type space,
and does not of course establish that the use of any particular simple type space is without
loss of generality.
In particular, applying notions of genericity to the belief-closed subspace of ￿nite types
must be done with care. Standard notions of genericity for such ￿nite spaces will not in
general correspond to strategic convergence. Therefore, results regarding strategic interac-
tions that hold on such "generic" subsets of the ￿nite spaces need not be close to the results
that would obtain with arbitrary type spaces. For example, our results complement those
of Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2004) on the drawbacks of analyzing genericity
with respect to collections of (in their case, priors over) types where beliefs about ￿ deter-
i.e., the expectation of the random variable, the expectation of the other player￿ s expectation of the random
variable, and so on. Convergence in the metric d￿￿ implies that there will be uniform convergence these
higher order expectations. Morris (2002) showed that ￿nite types are not dense in a topology de￿ned in
terms of uniform convergence of higher order expectations. Thus ￿nite types will not be dense under d￿￿.
18Bergemann and Morris (2001) showed that both the set of full surplus extraction types and the set of
non full surplus extraction types are dense in the product topology among ￿nite common prior types, and
the same argument would establish that they are dense in the strategic topology identi￿ed in this paper.
But of course it is trivial that neither set is dense in the discrete topology, which is the "right" topology for
the mechanism design problem.
34mine the entire hierarchy of beliefs, as is done, for instance, in Cremer and McLean (1985),
McAfee and Reny (1992), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
8 Appendix
For some proofs we use an alternative characterization of the interim-correlated-rationalizable
actions.
De￿nition 10 Fix a game G = (Ai;gi)i2I and a belief-closed subspace (Ti;￿￿
i)i2I. Given
S = (S1;S2), where each Si : Ti ! 2Ai￿
?, we say that S is an " best-response set if
Si (ti) ￿ BRi (ti;Sj;G;").
In Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2005) we prove that if S is a 0 best-response set then





jgi (a;￿) ￿ g
0
i (a;￿)j.
Lemma 9 : For any integer m and " > 0, there exists a ￿nite collection of m action games
G
m
such that, for every g 2 Gm, there exists g0 2 G
m
such that D(g;g0) ￿ ".


















For any game g, choose g0 2 GN to minimize D(g;g0). Clearly D(g;g0) ￿ 1
2N.
Lemma 10 For all i, ti,m, ai 2 Am
i , and g, g0 2 Gm
hi (tijai;g) ￿ hi (tijai;g
0) + 2D(g;g
0)
Proof. By the de￿nition of R, we know that R(g0;￿) is a ￿-best response set for g0. Thus
R(g0;￿) is a (￿ + 2D(g;g0))-best response set for g. So Ri (ti;g0;￿) ￿ Ri (ti;g;￿ + 2D(g;g0)).
Now if ai 2 Ri (ti;g0;￿), then ai 2 Ri (ti;g;￿ + 2D(g;g0)). So ￿ ￿ hi (tijai;g0) implies
￿ + 2D(g;g0) ￿ hi (tijai;g). So hi (tijai;g0) + 2D(g;g0) ￿ hi (tijai;g).
35Lemma 11
1. If for each m and each g 2 Gm, there exists ^ "
n ! 0 such that hi (tijai;g) < hi (tn
i jai;g)+
^ "
n for every n and ai 2 Am
i ; then for each m there exists "n ! 0 such that hi (tijai;g) <
hi (tn
i jai;g) + "n for every n, g 2 Gm and ai 2 Am
i .
2. If for each m and each g 2 Gm, there exists ^ "
n ! 0 such that hi (tn
i jai;g) < hi (tijai;g)+
^ "
n for every n and ai 2 Am
i ; then for each m there exists "n ! 0 such that hi (tn
i jai;g) <
hi (tijai;g) + "n for every n, g 2 Gmand ai 2 Am
i .
Proof. Lemma 10 implies that for ￿xed m; hi is continuous in g. Assume now to the
contrary that part (1) was false. Then there exists m and ￿ > 0 such that for all n there
is gn 2 Gm with hi (tijai;gn) ￿ hi (tn
i jai;gn) + ￿. Since Gm is a compact metric space, the
sequence gn has a convergent sub-sequence; denote the limit of that subsequence by ￿ g: Then
hi (tijai; ￿ g) ￿ hi (tn
i jai; ￿ g) + ￿=2, contradicting the hypothesis. The same argument proves
part (2).
Lemma 7: For any integer m and " > 0, there exists a ￿nite collection of m action games
￿ Gm such that, for every g 2 Gm, there exists g0 2 ￿ Gm such that for all i, ti, and ai 2 Am
i
jhi (tijai;g) ￿ hi (tijai;g
0)j ￿ ".
Proof. By lemma 9, we can choose ￿nite collection of games G
m
such that, for every g 2 Gm,
there exists g0 2 G
m
such that D(g;g0) ￿ "
2. Lemma 10 now implies that we also have




0) ￿ hi (tijai;g) + ".
Lemma 12 Fix any ￿nite collection of m action games G
m
and ￿ > 0. There exists a ￿nite
type space
￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿
i=1;2
and functions (fi)i=1;2, each fi : T ￿ ! ~ Ti, such that Ri (ti;g;") ￿
Ri (fi (ti);g;") for all ti 2 T ￿ and " 2 f0;￿;2￿;::::g.
36Proof. Let
￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿



















We argue that S is an "-best response set on the type space
￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿
i=1;2
. To see why,
suppose that
ai 2 Ri (ti;g;")























This implies that there exists ￿ 2 ￿(T ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj) such that











[gi (ai;aj;￿) ￿ gi (a
0
i;aj;￿)]d￿ ￿ ￿" for all a
0
i 2 Ai
Now de￿ne e v 2 ￿
￿





















marg~ Tj￿￿e v = e ￿i(e ti)
X
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￿ ￿" for all a
0
i 2 Ai





Since S is an "-best response set on the type space
￿












Thus ai 2 Ri (ti;g;") ) ai 2 Ri (fi (ti);g;").
Lemma 13 Fix any ￿nite collection of m action games ￿ Gm and ￿ > 0. There exists a ￿nite
type space
￿
~ Ti; ~ ￿i
￿
i=1;2
and functions (fi)i=1;2, each fi : T ￿ ! Ti, such that hi (fi (ti)jai;g) ￿
hi (tijai;g) + ￿ for all ti, g 2 G
m
and ai 2 Am
i .
37Proof. We will use the type space from lemma 12, which had the property that
Ri (ti;g;") ￿ Ri (fi (ti);g;") (4)
for all " 2 f0;￿;2￿;::::g. By de￿nition,




















hi (fi (ti)jai;g) ￿ hhi (tijai;g)i
￿ ￿ hi (tijai;g) + ￿.
Lemma 8: Fix the number of actions m and ￿ > 0. There exists a ￿nite type space
(Ti;b ￿i)i=1;2 and functions (fi)i=1;2, each fi : T ￿ ! ~ Ti, such that hi (fi (ti)jai;g) ￿ hi (tijai;g)+
￿ for all ti, g 2 Gm and ai 2 Am
i .
Proof. Fix m and ￿ > 0. By lemma 7, there exists a ￿nite collection of m-action games G
m
such that for every ￿nite-action game g, there exists g0 2 G
m
such that










for all i, ti and ai. By lemma 13, there exists a ￿nite type space
￿




(fi)i=1;2, each fi : T ￿ ! ~ Ti, such that




for all ti, g 2 G
m
and ai 2 Am
i .
Now ￿x any i, ti, ai and g. By (5), there exists g0 such that
hi (tijai;g





















(hi (fi (ti)jai;g) ￿ hi (fi (ti)jai;g0))
+(hi (fi (ti)jai;g0) ￿ hi (tijai;g0))





Theorem 4: If #￿ ￿ 2, in￿nite types are dense under the product topology and the strategic
topology.
Proof. It is enough to argue that for an arbitrary n and t￿ 2 T ￿
n, we can construct a sequence
tk which converges to t￿ in the strategic topology (and thus the product topology) such that
each tk = 2 TF. Let T1 = T2 = f1;:::;ng and ￿i : f1;:::;ng ! ￿(f1;:::;ng ￿ ￿) (as before
these are to be viewed as a belief-closed subspace of the universal type space.) Without loss
of generality, we can identify t￿ 2 T ￿
n with type 1 of player 1.
The strategy of proof is simply to allow player i to have an additional signal about Tj￿￿
(which will require an in￿nite number of types for each player) but let the informativeness
of those signals go to zero. Thus we will have a sequence of types not in TF but converging
to t￿ in the strategic topology (and thus the product topology).








for k = 1;2;:::;1. Let
us suppose each player i observes an additional signal zi 2 f1;2;:::g, and de￿ne T k
i =
Ti ￿ f1;2;:::g, with typical element (ni;zi). ) Fix ￿ 2 (0;1) and for each k = 1;2;:::, choose
￿k






to satisfy the following two properties:
￿ ￿￿
k


















0; and all (ni;zi) 6= (n0
i;z0
i).
39For k = 1, set
￿
1
i ((nj;zj);￿j(ni;zi)) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
zj￿1￿i (nj;￿jni),
where (9) is not satis￿ed (but holds instead with equality).
We distinguish the di⁄erent copies of T k
i with the superscript k because we identify a
type (ni;zi) in T k
i as potentially distinct from (ni;zi) 2 T k0
i when viewed as types in the
universal type space . Note that in the type space (T 1
i ;￿1
i ), for each ni 2 Ti every type
(ni;zi) 2 Ti ￿ f1;2;:::g corresponds to the same type in the universal type space, namely
the type in the universal type space that corresponds to type ni in the type space (Ti;￿i).
On the other hand, from (9) we see that for all other type spaces with k 6= 1, each distinct








correspond to distinct types in the universal type








Now (9) also implies that each tk = 2 TF.
We will argue that the sequence tk converges to t￿ in the strategic topology. To see why, for
any (ni;zi) 2 T k
i = Ti￿f1;2;:::g, let Si (ni;zi) = Ri (ni;G;￿) (i.e., the set of ￿-rationalizable
actions of type ni of player i in game G on the original type space). First observe that S
is an ￿-best-response set in game G on the type space (T 1
i ;￿1
i )i=1;2. This is true because,
as noted, the type space (T 1
i ;￿1
i )i=1;2 and the original type space (Ti;￿i)i=1;2 correspond to
the same belief-closed subspace of the universal type space. (The only di⁄erence is that in
(T 1
i ;￿1
i )i=1;2 it is common knowledge that each player i observes a conditionally independent
draw with probabilities (1 ￿ ￿)￿
zi￿1 on f1;2;:::g.) But now by (8), S is an ￿ + 2M
k best





. Thus the sequence
￿
tk;t￿￿
satis￿es the lower strategic convergence property. By corollary 1, this implies strategic
convergence. By theorem 1, we also have product convergence.
Proposition 2: d￿￿ is equivalent to d￿.
Proof. First, observe that if d￿￿ (ti;t0
i) ￿ ", then for any measurable f : T ￿
j ￿￿ ! [￿M;M],
jE (fj￿
￿ (ti)) ￿ E (fj￿
￿ (t
0
i))j ￿ 2". (10)
To see this, for any k, we will de￿ne fk : T ￿
j ￿￿ ! [￿M;M] that is measurable with respect








o f (tj;￿)d(￿￿ (ti)), that
is, fk is the expected value according to ￿￿ (ti) of the function f evaluated over all tj with
40the same ￿rst k levels. Now fk ! f pointwise so by the bounded convergence theorem
E (fkj￿￿ (t0
i)) ! E (fj￿￿ (t0
i)). By the de￿nition (and iterated expectations) E (fkj￿￿ (ti)) =
E (fj￿￿ (ti)). Since d￿￿ (ti;t0
i) ￿ " we know that for all k, jE (fkj￿￿ (ti)) ￿ E (fkj￿￿ (t0
i))j ￿ ".
Now suppose that ai 2 Ri (ti;G;￿). Then there exists ￿ 2 ￿
￿
T ￿
j ￿ ￿ ￿ Aj
￿
such that
(1) ￿ [f(tj;￿;aj) : aj 2 Rj (tj;G;￿)g] = 1





[gi (ai;aj;￿) ￿ gi (a0
i;aj;￿)]d￿ ￿ ￿￿ for all a0
i 2 Ai
Let ￿0 be a measure whose marginal on T ￿ ￿ ￿ is ￿￿
i (t0
i) and whose probability on Aj,
conditional on (tj;￿) is the same as ￿. Since T ￿
j ￿￿￿Aj is a separable standard measure space






￿(A￿i), measurable as a function of T ￿
j ￿ ￿. De￿ne ￿0 2 ￿
￿
T ￿
j ￿ ￿ ￿ A￿i
￿
, by setting,
for measurable F ￿ T ￿
j ; ￿0 (F ￿ f￿;ajg) =
R
F (￿ (ajjtj;￿) ￿ ￿i (ti))[dtj;￿].19 Let fai;a0
i be a
function taking the value
R
















[gi (ai;aj;￿) ￿ gi (a
0
i;aj;￿)]d￿ ￿ 2"(2) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 4"
Thus ai 2 Ri (t0
i;G;￿ + 4"). Since this argument holds for every game G independent of
the cardinality of the action sets, we have d￿ (ti;t0
i) ￿ 4".
On the other hand, if d￿￿ (ti;t0
i) ￿ " then there exists k such that
jE (fj￿






for some bounded f that is measurable with respect to kth level beliefs. Now lemma 4 states
that that we can construct a game G and action ai such that hi (t0
ijai;G) + "
































i ;ti) ! 0 if and only if d￿ (tn
i ;ti) ! 0.
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